The establishment of a Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) which would combine the members of three existing regional economic communities, i.e. the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), was decided at the 2008 Tripartite Summit. The purpose of the TFTA will be to harmonise trade arrangements among SADC, COMESA and EAC, improve the movement of persons within the region, facilitate the joint implementation of infrastructure projects and enhance co-operation of members.
INTRODUCTION
The establishment of a Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) which would combine the members of three existing regional economic communities, i.e. the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), was decided at the 2008 Tripartite Summit. The purpose of the TFTA will be to harmonise trade arrangements among SADC, COMESA and EAC, improve the movement of persons within the region, facilitate the joint implementation of infrastructure projects and enhance co-operation of members. Finally, at the Summit the ultimate goal of the TFTA was to establish a Customs Union that involves the Tripartite Member States.
One of the TFTA's objectives is to help avoid the problems of overlapping membership in regional economic communities. However, this benefit will only materialise if the TFTA will replace the existing communities, at least in the long term. Otherwise, it would create another layer of regional integration and might even further complicate trade and hence increase transaction costs for both importers and exporters.
The TFTA, COMESA, EAC and SADC therefore need a strategy for harmonisation. This will have to address legal, policy, economic and institutional issues. The future roles of the communities and their institutions under the new TFTA framework need to be defined in such a way as to avoid duplication of responsibilities and inefficient use of resources.
The aim of the paper is to provide inputs for the definition of such a strategy. Based on a review of regional integration processes in the Caribbean as well as lessons drawn from the political economy of regional integration, it provides recommendations for the future relationship between the TFTA and the three regional economic communities (RECs).
A GLIMPSE ON THE STATUS QUO
The establishment of the TFTA will be a unique step, and a first of its kind in the history of economic cooperation, as it will combine three already existing RECs. The process of merging will be confronted with a number of challenges -mainly regarding the harmonisation of structures and procedures of the existing RECs -which no other regional integration arrangement has experienced. In order to study these challenges, three issues need to be considered: First, the appropriateness of the current plans for the establishment and operation of the TFTA as laid down in the Draft Report on Establishing the Tripartite FTA needs to be analysed. Second, the ongoing process of deepening the existing RECs toward customs unions and common markets will have implications for overlapping membership issues and the justification of establishing the TFTA. Finally, the ongoing processes in the RECs and the plans for the TFTA need to be aligned.
The Draft Report on Establishing the Tripartite Free Trade Area and Overlapping Membership Issues
In early November 2009, the Tripartite Coordination Mechanism prepared a road map for the TFTA, the "Draft Report on Establishing the Tripartite Free Trade Area" (hereafter Draft Report).
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The Draft Report includes the "Draft Agreement Establishing the Tripartite Free Trade Area" (hereafter Draft Agreement) and a road map for the establishment of the TFTA, along with an explanation of the proposed rules for the TFTA.
The Draft Report argues that the TFTA will bring about a number of benefits to its members. One of them, arguably the key benefit of the TFTA as mentioned in the Draft Report is that it will help avoid the problems of overlapping membership in RECs ( § §36f).
Overlapping membership creates problems both for member governments, business and regional integration at the macro level. For governments, membership costs are higher. What is more important, there is a high likelihood that the programmes and activities of the different RECs are contradictory, thereby causing inconsistencies in members' regional integration policies as well as creating contradictory obligations and loyalties to the different RECs. Most importantly, once RECs develop into customs unions, overlapping membership will only be possible if all customs unions always apply the same common external tariff (CET).
For businesses, overlapping membership increases costs due to more complicated and less transparent rules for cross border trade -depending on whether the trading partner is a member of one or the other REC, conditions of trade will vary. For example, different rules of origin and customs procedures will be applied. Finally, at the macro level duplication of efforts and conflicting regional integration policies slow down "integration, reducing the regional economic communities' effectiveness, and stretching thin limited financial resources" 3 .
The Draft Report, drawing on UNECA's assessment of regional integration in Africa, explicitly refers to a number of potential gains from the removal of overlapping membership:
Efficient allocation of resources; increased trade between member countries and countries outside the region; gain in economies of scale; strong negotiating position; welfare gains, improved productivity; higher wages; policy credibility; more efficient provision of public goods; and fewer regional conflicts. As the challenges of globalisation become more pronounced, regional integration holds potential towards economic diversification and increased competitiveness of the region's constituent economies. ( §37) However, the Draft Report fails to answer how the TFTA will help to achieve these benefits. For instance, some benefits would already result if the existing RECs harmonise their policies and procedures. Indeed, as we will see below, such harmonisation is already under implementation in a range of issues, so that the importance of actual costs of overlapping membership is probably less high than the theoretical arguments suggest.
Nevertheless, the benefits of removing of overlapping membership will only materialise fully if the TFTA will replace the existing RECs. Otherwise, it would create an additional layer of regional integration and might even further complicate trade and hence increase transaction costs for both importers and exporters. Even if the three RECs harmonise their procedures (the Draft Report mentions this as another benefit of the TFTA), some issues, such as rules of origin, cannot be harmonised as long as different RECs continue to exist.
In the long run therefore, the TFTA should replace the existing three RECs. Such a long-term perspective is presented in the Draft Report, but only vaguely. The Draft Report stipulates that the "assumption has been made that the FTA trading arrangements of each of the three RECs will be replaced by the Tripartite Free Trade Area arrangements upon full implementation" ( §179). Note that this refers only to "FTA trading arrangements" of the existing RECs, not to the RECs as such; furthermore, there is no definition or target date for the "full implementation" of TFTA arrangements.
The Draft Agreement, for its part, does not entail the long term vision of the TFTA replacing the existing RECs. However, it does address potential conflicts by giving priority to the TFTA: "In the event of inconsistency or a conflict between this Agreement and the treaties and instruments of COMESA, EAC and SADC, this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency or conflict" (Art. 41 (2)).
The Ongoing Deepening of Existing RECs and Overlapping Membership Issues
Independently of the TFTA, COMESA, EAC and SADC have been advancing their internal integration processes at an accelerated speed in the recent past. As mentioned, overlapping membership of a country in two customs unions is only possible if both customs unions have the same CETs. This is actually planned for the COMESA customs union, whose CET is harmonised with the EAC CET. Conversely, the COMESA customs union and SACU CETs are not aligned. Therefore, unless SACU and COMESA can agree on harmonised external tariffs, Swaziland cannot be a member of both the COMESA customs union and SACU and has to decide to which of the two customs unions it wants to belong. Other countries which are both members of SADC and COMESA -DR Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe -will face the same decision when the SADC customs union is launched.
In addition to the deepening of integration taking place within the RECs various initiatives of harmonisation among RECs are also under way. The harmonised CET in COMESA and the EAC is one important example. Other areas of harmonisation include the regimes on rules of origin in COMESA and EAC. At the Tripartite level, a common approach has been adopted for elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade, and the work programme also covers harmonisation in a wide range of areas including infrastructure, energy, trade in services, movement of business persons, customs procedures, health and technical standards, unfair trade practices and institutional arrangements.
Summary: the Added Value of the TFTA in Addressing Overlapping Membership Issues
Summarising the two strands of developments both within the existing RECs and with regard to the TFTA the picture is that significant efforts are being made with regard to harmonisation among RECs while the provisions in the TFTA for the eventual replacement of RECs by the TFTA are "weak". What does this mean for the establishment of the TFTA?
One could be tempted to say that the stronger harmonisation is among RECs, the weaker is the argument for a TFTA. If substantial harmonisation takes place, and problems of overlapping membership can be removed, without the need to create the TFTA -what then is the added value of the TFTA after all?
Such an argument would be flawed because, first, harmonisation among the RECs is at least in part owed to the harmonisation drive coming from the plans to establish the TFTA. Also, important areas are not yet harmonised in practice, and the impetus for the implementation of harmonisation efforts will need to be maintained -which is easier done in an institutionalised structure such as the TFTA. And finally, only the TFTA will guarantee that current harmonisation efforts are not reversed.
Therefore, the current wave of harmonisation among RECs should be seen as a useful preparatory move for the establishment of the TFTA. What it needs to be complemented with, however, is a stronger vision for the TFTA to eventually replace the existing RECs in order to permanently eliminate problems arising from overlapping membership.
What is also important for the TFTA is that -assuming that all 26 countries participate -it will be an FTA comprising of two customs unions (possibly one of them having deepened into a common market) and a number of Member States which are not members of customs unions. This means that the TFTA will have Members with different degrees of regional integration. This heterogeneity among Members will have to be reflected in the institutional structure of the TFTA. It is therefore interesting to see how other regional integration arrangements have dealt with the issue of concomitance of different integration stages.
REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE CARIBBEAN: LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FOR THE TFTA
Establishing a regional FTA consisting of economically diverse members is by no means an easy task, as the failed attempt at creating the Free Trade Areas of the Americas has shown. 
Regional Integration in the Caribbean: an Overview
The Caribbean provides a good example of how regional integration can take place at varying speed and overlapping membership. In the region, two RECs exist, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The latter was founded later and its Members are also CARICOM Members, but they have reached a deeper degree of integration.
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was established in 1973, replacing its predecessor, the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA), which had been in existence since 1965. In fact, CARICOM originally consisted of two institutions with separate legal bases: the Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community and the Agreement establishing the Common Market (later on annexed to the Treaty). In addition to economic issues, the Community instrument addressed issues of foreign policy coordination and functional cooperation. Issues of economic integration, particularly those related to trade arrangements, were addressed in the Common Market Annex. This institutional arrangement allowed countries to join CARICOM without being parties to the Common Market regime -for example, the Bahamas are a Member of CARICOM but not of the common market.
Discussions for further economic integration among CARICOM Members started in the late 1980s and culminated in the adoption, in 2002, of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, which establishes the legal basis for the establishment of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME). According to the Treaty, the single market includes the free movement of goods, services, skilled workers and capital among member countries, the right of establishment of CARICOM nationals anywhere in the Community, a common external tariff and a coordinated foreign trade policy. The single economy includes macroeconomic policy coordination, harmonization of laws and regulations, and Community-wide sector-specific policies on agriculture, industry, services and transport.
Twelve of the 15 CARICOM Member States are currently in the process of establishing the CSME July 2006. Nevertheless, full implementation of the CSME is expected to be completed by 2015 only. The implementation process entails, among other things, the integration of national goods, services and factor markets through intra-regional liberalization and regulatory harmonization and, as a result, the creation of a single, seamless market space within the Community.
The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was established in 1981 by seven countries, all of which are also members of CARICOM 7 , in an effort to deepen the sub-regional integration arrangements and to consolidate an inner concentric circle of the region's integration movement but with points of relevance and contact to the wider CARICOM. The OECS Members share a single currency (and central bank) as well as a common Supreme Court. They are currently in the process of establishing a treaty to establish the OECS Economic Union and create a Single Financial and Economic Space. There is no long-term strategy for a merger between the OECS and CARICOM.
To summarise, regional integration in the Caribbean presently sees countries (excluding those which are not participating in the two RECs at all) at three different levels of integration stages: integration is deepest among the Members of the OECS, which constitutes an institution separate of CARICOM, followed by those countries which are currently participating in the implementation of the CSME. The third group of countries is composed by Members of CARICOM which are not participating in the CSME.
Analysing the Caribbean Experience
Caribbean integration can be analysed by applying regional integration concepts which have been developed in the European context. These key concepts appear under different names -famous ones are the concepts of concentric circles, variable geometry, enhanced co-operation and multi speed Europe -but basically address the same issue: that within a regional arrangement different degrees of integration co-exist at the same time.
The concept of concentric circles describes a regional integration arrangement made up of subsets of states which have achieved different levels of integration. Thus, the OECS could be interpreted as the most inner circle, which is surrounded by the CSME circle, and finally the outer circle would comprise all CARICOM Members.
In a similar way, "multi-speed integration" is the term used to describe the idea of differentiated integration whereby common objectives are pursued by one group of Member States both able and willing to advance, it being implied that the others will follow later. Note that strictly speaking this idea refers to different levels of integration within one contractual arrangement -it would therefore aptly describe the different status of CSME-and non-CSME Members within CARICOM but not the role of the OECS. The same applies to the concept of "variable geometry", which used to describe a method of differentiated integration when there are irreconcilable differences within the integration structure, and which therefore allows for a permanent separation between a group of Member States and a number of less developed integration units.
Comparing the Caribbean Experience with Eastern and Southern Africa
Finally, there is a certain analogy between the situation in the Caribbean and in Eastern and Southern Africa. Thus, integration is deepest among the OECS countries, which constitute a subset of CARICOM. In Eastern and Southern Africa, the EAC and SACU are in an analogous situation at present: they are areas of enhanced co-operation among a sub-set of COMESA and SADC Members, respectively. This analogy is shown in the following table, which also depicts the potential situation in Eastern and Southern Africa after the establishment of the TFTA, which will be discussed in more detail in section 5 below. However, the analogy between the two regions is not perfect. Contrary to the Caribbean, where the model of concentric circles works quite well, in Eastern and Southern Africa there are two groups of countries with "enhanced co-operation", i.e. SACU and EAC. Under the TFTA, this may cause internal inconsistencies and conflict, whereby the costs of overlapping membership in different organisations could be replaced by costs of intra-organisational frictions and rivalry within the TFTA. In order to analyse these risks in more detail, and devise strategies to avoid them, it is helpful to resort to regional integration theories based on political economy.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THEORETICAL INSIGHTS?
Put very simply, the question to be answered is: Can a regional integration arrangement such as the TFTA work if it has two poles of enhanced co-operation, or will competition and rivalry between these poles tear apart the larger institution?
Indeed, research has shown that the higher the number of members in a regional agreement, the higher is the likelihood of failure. The reasons for this are varied. Olson (1965) has shown that the size of a group is inversely correlated with its ability to act collectively. More importantly, Haggard (1997) argues that large groups increase the likelihood of preference divergence among members. This situation may be particularly important in the case of the TFTA which would combine different RECs with different histories, cultures and preferences. By allowing the continuation of different poles of enhanced cooperation, different preferences might be perpetuated and accentuated, thus blocking the deepening of integration of the wider institution.
Another theoretical approach explaining regional integration highlights the role of hegemonic powers driving the integration process (Gilpin 1975 (Gilpin , 1987 Krasner 1976 ). This approach may explain regional integration in Southern Africa, i.e. SADC and SACU (Soko 2007) . If this approach is right, the stability of the TFTA could then depend on whether or not South Africa is strong enough to exert its hegemonial power in the wider TFTA context. If this is not the case, the likelihood of conflict between the Southern and Eastern poles of integration will be high.
In summary, the two poles of integration within the TFTA are likely to have a negative effect on the TFTA operation which will gain in importance as integration deepens. Thus, there might be little concern as long as the TFTA is only a free trade area. However, deepening it into a Tripartite Customs Union will require careful negotiations and balancing of interests among the Member States.
THE WAY FORWARD: FUTURE ROLES FOR THE TRIPARTITE FTA AND THE EXISTING COMMUNITIES
Obviously, from an economic point of view the optimum solution for the TFTA would be to have one coherent institution comprising the 26 countries which are currently Members in at least one of the existing three RECs. In such a situation, problems and inefficiencies arising from overlapping membership would be eliminated. A TFTA in which one sub-group of countries (such as EAC or SACU) is integrated more deeply would also pose little problem. The TFTA could then be understood as a regional integration arrangement based on the concept of concentric circles.
However, given the existing situation in which different RECs already exist, and political economy approaches show that the dissolution of existing institutions is rarely if ever achievable, the first best solution for the TFTA does not appear to be a feasible option in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the ultimate objective of the TFTA integrating and replacing the existing RECs should be made explicit in the TFTA Agreement.
In practice, the actual design of the TFTA will be the implementation of a second best option. It has to be based on the fact that the three RECs (four, if SACU is also taken into account 9 ) will continue to exist in the medium term at least.
Under this key assumption two options for the sequencing of the TFTA establishment exist: Under the first option, a harmonised deepening of the existing RECs would be completed first and the TFTA be established thereafter. Conversely, the TFTA could be established first with further harmonisation to take place thereafter within the TFTA.
The first option assumes that the RECs -notably COMESA and SADC -would continue with their ongoing and planned integration programmes, i.e. the establishment of customs unions. This would also require that membership in the RECs is rationalised: overlapping membership in the different RECs should be avoided. Thus, it would make sense for Tanzania to re-join COMESA (as all other EAC Members are also COMESA Members) 10 . Furthermore, all countries which could potentially be Members of the COMESA and SADC customs unions -DR Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe -would have to make a choice between the two. Finally, pursuing this option would mean that the establishment of the TFTA would have to wait until the ongoing deepening of integration within the RECs has been implemented.
The second option would give priority to the establishment of the TFTA. Initially, the TFTA would start -as planned in the Draft Agreement -with a modest degree of integration, i.e. as a free trade area. The ongoing efforts of COMESA and SADC to establish customs unions should be halted. This approach would have the advantage that conflicts arising from overlapping memberships in the COMESA and SADC customs unions would be avoided -countries would not have to choose which customs union to join, and also the difficult negotiations of harmonising COMESA and SADC CETs would be avoided. 9 The importance of SACU for the TFTA arrangement should be recognised in the further negotiations of the TFTA Agreement, which could possibly be extended into a "Quadripartite FTA Agreement". 10 The issue of whether or not Tanzania should re-join COMESA is one of heated debate in economic and political circles of the country. The Government of Tanzania has recently made clear, however, that such a move is not contemplated at present.
If option two is pursued, the relations between the RECs would be structured along the lines depicted in the third column of the table above. There would be two regions of enhanced cooperation within the TFTA, the EAC as an "Eastern African pole of integration" and SACU as the "Southern African pole of integration". Countries which are in neither of the poles of integration would be members of the "mere" Tripartite FTA, i.e. remain at a relatively low degree of regional integration.
The structure of the TFTA could thus conceptually be described with the concepts of "multispeed TFTA" or "variable geometry TFTA" whereby the arrangement would start with three levels of integration: at the lowest level of integration would be countries which are not in a position to implement the TFTA immediately. This group would probably include those of the 26 countries which are currently not Members in any of the FTAs. The second group of countries would be the Members of the TFTA but not of SACU or the EAC. Finally, Members of the EAC and SACU would constitute the third, most deeply integrated group of countries. The Tripartite Summit of October 2008 accepted the principle of variable geometry, and the Draft Agreement also incorporates the principle referring to it as the "flexibility which allows for progression in co-operation amongst members in a larger integration scheme in a variety of areas and at different speeds". The proposed structuring of different layers of integration is therefore in line with the TFTA concepts already discussed; nevertheless, in the long run a conversion of the EAC and SACU into TFTA sub-arrangements should be envisaged.
Why would this structure constitute a second best option? First, the existence of two poles of integration may result in tensions between the poles and prevent further integration of the TFTA Members. In the worst case, centrifugal forces may cause the failure of the institution. Second, by putting on hold the current efforts of COMESA and SADC to establish customs unions, the current drive for a deepening of regional integration efforts may be lost. After all establishing the TFTA as a free trade area falls behind the COMESA Customs Union already launched. Nevertheless, going this one step back is required in order to address the inconsistencies which would arise from multiple membership in different customs unions. Furthermore, negotiations for the launch of the Tripartite Customs Union could then start relatively quickly, using the agreements already reached for the COMESA and SADC customs unions, as well as the mechanisms in force in the EAC and SACU, as a starting point.
Finally, under the proposed option, much of the raison d'être for COMESA and SADC would disappear, as both RECs would merge into the TFTA, in the context of which further integration would take place. Nevertheless, the dissolution of COMESA and SADC seems unfeasible in the foreseeable future, precisely because both COMESA and SADC are more than mere free trade areas. It is therefore suggested that a TFTA Secretariat would take over responsibilities for all issues related to the establishment of the free trade area, as well as negotiations for further integration. The COMESA and SADC institutions would continue to be in charge of their other current activities, which could be gradually handed over to the TFTA institution as integration progresses.
